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 Francis Walsh
 The changing industrial structures
 of Northern and Southern
 Ireland*
 INTRODUCTION
 The partition of Ireland in the early part of this century was founded on
 fundamental differences, not only in religious, but perhaps more important,
 in economic composition between the two parts of the island. The following
 paper presents evidence which suggests that these differences in economic
 composition have tended to be reduced in recent years. The resultant
 convergence in economic structure must necessarily have significant
 political repercussions. By way of conclusion, some speculations on what
 these repercussions might be are offered.
 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AT THE TIME OF PARTITION
 At the time of the partition of Ireland, originating v ith the Government of
 Ireland Act of 1920, fundamental differences in economic composition
 were to be observed as between Northern Ireland on the one hand, and
 what was to become the Irish Free State, and subsequently the Irish
 Republic, on the other. The North was essentially an industrial economy,
 with over one third of its workforce employed in manufacturing activity.
 This overall figure, of course, disguised great internal variation. The
 western, predominantly Catholic, part of the new state portrayed an
 agriculturally orientated economy similar to the South, while the part east
 of the Bann was particularly heavily industrialised, with some three
 quarters of the workforce in the Belfast heartland engaged in industry.1
 This industrial base was founded on three interlinked industries ? linen,
 engineering, and shipbuilding. The rapid development of the linen industry
 This paper was originally presented to the session on 'Imperialism and Social conflict in
 Ireland' at the annual conference of the Institute of British Geographers, Manchester, Jan.
 1979.
 1. W. Black, 1967, 'Industrial change in the twentieth century', in J. C. Beckett and R. E.
 Glasscock (Eds.), Belfast: The Origin and Growth of an Industrial City; London; B.B.C.,
 158.
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 4  THE MAYNOOTH REVIEW
 in the nineteenth century, and the accompanying mechanisation thereof,
 had engendered a substantial spin-off in the form of textile machinery
 engineering, and the consequent establishment of engineering capabilities
 contributed to a large extent to the emergence of the shipbuilding sector.
 The northeastern industrial complex, therefore, was heavily interdependent,
 and it was highly oriented towards exports, a position which rendered it
 very vulnerable to the vicissitudes of international trade.
 The South, on the other hand, was basically an agricultural economy. In
 1926, over half the workforce was engaged in farming, with a mere 13.3
 per cent occupied in industry.2 Of the latter, a further one third were
 'marginal industrial workers', working either for themselves, or in tiny
 concerns not covered by the Census of Industrial Production.
 Manufacturing employment covered by the C.I.P., at 60,000, represented
 a mere 4.5 per cent of total employment.3 Industry in the South was based
 largely on the processing of agricultural raw materials, both imported and
 home-produced. It also portrayed significant spatial variation, being
 heavily concentrated in the ports, especially Dublin, which in 1931
 accounted for 44 per cent of employment in firms covered by the Census of
 Industrial Production.4 However, unlike Belfast, Dublin was by no means
 an industrial city.5 Although many port-based industries, such as distilling,
 were to an extent export orientated, southern industry in general was
 geared to the home market. In 1929, 85 per cent of industrial workers were
 employed in firms producing for the home market.6
 THE PROCESS OF CONVERGENCE: (i) THE NORTH:
 Ironically, the origins of the process which has already produced major
 changes in the North's industrial structure can be traced to 1921, the first
 year of the new state's life. The international slump ofthat year exposed the
 inherent vulnerability of the regional industrial base, with unemployment
 reaching 18 per cent of the labour force. Government policy in support of
 industry was initiated the following year when the first of what proved to be
 a series of Loans Guarantee Acts was introduced. The subsequent
 international recovery improved matters, greatly, but even though linen
 2. K. A. Kennedy and R. Bruton, 1975, The Irish Economy, Brussels; Commission of the
 European Communities; Table 1.6, 11.
 3. F. S. L. Lyons, 1971, Ireland Since the Famine; London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson;
 590; Kennedy and Bruton, op. cit., 46. The C.I.P. covers firms employing three or more workers.
 4. J. Meenan, 1970, The Irish Economy since 1922; Liverpool University Press; Table 5.3, 134.
 5. Black, op. cit., 158.
 6. Lyons, op. cit., 590.
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 cloth production reached an all-time high in 1927, the unemployment rate
 nevertheless averaged 15 per cent in that year, and the North was left well
 and truly in the doldrums by the onset of the Great Depression after 1929.
 By 1932, unemployment had reached 27 per cent, and in that year, the
 New Industries (Development) Act provided grants, rate exemptions and
 interest free loans in an attempt to stimulate the establishment of new
 industry. This was the first clear admission that something was amiss with
 Northern industry, a fact which was driven home forcefully in 1934 when
 one of Belfast's two shipyards closed down.7
 Hopes that the North's industrial problems were purely a function of
 international depression began to lessen as the nineteen thirties progressed
 and other industrial regions of the U.K. made much better recoveries. The
 shipbuilding and allied engineering sectors were obviously major casualities
 of a slump in international trade, and indeed these sectors made a fine
 recovery, with employment levels reaching the 1929 level by 1939, albeit
 under the impetus provided by war preparations. However, the problems of
 the linen industry were much more deep-rooted. This sector was no longer
 able to match the competition of cotton, and in particular the rapidly
 developing synthetic textiles industries. By mid-1938, more than half of the
 industry's work force was unemployed, thereby boosting the overall
 regional unemployment rate to 28.3 per cent. The decline in the linen cloth
 sector was passed on in turn to the engineering sector which had developed
 to serve the linen industry. Thus the industrial interdependence of the
 region, once a great source of strength, was now appearing as a serious
 weakness.8 Hence, \ . . since at least 1936, Northern Ireland
 unemployment rates have exceeded those in any other region of the United
 Kingdom'.9 In recognition of this fact, regional industrial policy,
 augmented by a further New Industries (Development) Act in 1937, was
 allowed to provide industrial incentives superior to those available in other
 depressed regions of the U.K., a position which has been maintained ever
 since.
 The industrial restructuring of Northern Ireland was postponed
 temporarily by the second world war and the immediate postwar boom,
 which provided a substantial boost to the ailing linen industry. In addition,
 the Belfast shipyards, largely untouched by the war, were able to cash in on
 the widespread destruction of similar facilities elsewhere in Europe and
 Japan. However, a short-term asset became a long-term liability, for these
 7. Ibid., 698; Black, op. cit., 161-2.
 8. Lyons, op. cit., 698-9; Black, op. cit., 162-3.
 9. A. S. M?rie et al., 1974, Regional planning and the attraction of manufacturing
 industry in Northern Ireland; London; Centre for Environmental Studies Research Paper
 No. 4;'21.*
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 other shipyards were re-equipped with the most modern technology?
 thereby eventually providing a challenge which Belfast was unable to meet.
 In addition, demand for the products in which the Belfast shipyards
 specialised, particularly passenger liners and aircraft carriers, declined in
 the postwar period. Thus, by the early nineteen sixties, employment in the
 Belfast shipyards had dropped to one half the level of 1950.10
 The extension of regional planning policy in the U.K. after 1945 had
 further consequent spin-offs in Northern Ireland. However, whereas loans
 were the principal incentives in operation in Britain's Development Areas,
 grants remained the North's leading industrial policy device. Additional
 Industries Development Acts were introduced between 1945 and 1953.
 The main policy objective at this stage was to attract new British plants to
 Northern Ireland, although such a policy was unlikely to meet with much
 success so long as the Industrial Development Certificates, designed to
 control the establishment of new industry in the successful south east and
 west midlands of England, were not rigorously applied as a regional policy
 device. Thus, the Northern Ireland government set about the modernisation
 of the existing industrial structure, with the passing of the 1951 Re
 equipment of Industry Act and its successor, the 1954 Capital Grants to
 Industry Act.11
 The nineteen sixties saw a much more rigorous regional policy being
 implemented at the U.K. level. I.D.C. policy was considerably
 strengthened, and a large scale programme of advance factory construction
 was introduced. In 1967, the regional employment premium was initiated.
 Northern Ireland, maintaining its superior incentive schemes, was a
 substantial beneficiary of this strengthening of policy. By 1970, the North
 was able to offer 62.9 per cent of the capital costs (building, plant and
 machinery) of a new project compared to 50.6 per cent in the Development
 Areas, and 34.1 per cent elsewhere in the U.K. In addition, industrial
 derating at 75 per cent, an industrial fuel subsidy, industrial training
 schemes, housing for key workers, and business advice are available to new
 industries starting in Northern Ireland.12 It is estimated that these
 additional incentives have been worth up to 40,000 extra industrial jobs in
 the period 1960-70, quite a substantial contribution given a total
 manufacturing workforce of 153,000 in 1975.13
 After 1970, I.D.C. policy in Britain was relaxed somewhat, and
 although industrial incentives (including a doubling of the regional
 10. M. A. Busteed, 1974, Northern Ireland; London; Oxford U.P., 9-10. Also Black, op. cit., 165.
 11. M?rie, et. al., op. cit., 34.
 12. Ibid., 34-5.
 13. B. Moore, et al., 1978, 'Industrial policy And economic development: the experience of
 Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland'; Cambridge Journal of Economics; 2; 104.
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 employment premium in 1974) were further strengthened, the onset of civil
 unrest greatly reduced the flow of new industry into Northern Ireland. It
 has been estimated that the political situation cost the North 20,000
 potential jobs in the period 1970-76.14 As a result, both unemployment
 rates and emigration levels (the latter no doubt also linked to the civil
 unrest) have risen compared with the late nineteen sixties.15
 THE PROCESS OF CONVERGENCE: (ii) THE SOUTH
 In the South, a coherent and vigorous industrial policy did not emerge until
 1932, the same year that the first industrial development act was
 introduced in the North. In that year, the economic nationalism of the new
 De Valera regime combined with growing international protectionism to
 produce a policy of economic autarky, involving the exclusion of foreign
 investment and the development of an indigenous industrial sector
 producing for the home market behind high tariff walls. The new policy
 was quick to show results: industrial production rose by 40 per cent
 between 1931 and 1936, while employment in manufacturing covered by
 the Census of Industrial Production, which stood at 60,000 in 1926,
 reached 100,000 in 1938.16
 However: 'Once the more obvious possibilities of industrial expansion
 had been exploited, new opportunities were likely to be few'.17 Thus, the
 rate of expansion of industrial output dropped from 40 per cent between
 1931-36 to 4.5 per cent between 1936-8.18 Lacking an export base,
 industry in the South was unable to take advantage of the opportunities
 provided by the second world war, and instead, suffered a contraction
 during this period. However, it experienced rapid expansion in the
 immediate postwar period, as pent-up savings were released on a spending
 spree. By 1951, total manufacturing employment, including those activities
 not covered by the C.I.P., reached 184,000 compared with 113,000 in
 19.36.19
 However, this temporary boom served only to veil some basic
 weaknesses inherent in the autarky policy ? weaknesses which had briefly
 revealed themselves just before the war, but which became increasingly
 apparent as the nineteen fifties progressed. These weaknesses have been
 examined by the author elsewhere.20 The owners of indigenous Irish capital
 14. Ibid., 105. Also M?rie, et al., op. cit., 35.
 15. Moore, et al., op. cit., Tables 2 (109) and 3 (110).
 16. Lyons, op. cit., 609; L. M. Cullen, 1972, An Economie History of Ireland since 1666;
 London; Batsford; 178-9; Kennedy and Bruton, op. cit.? 46.
 17. Cullen, op. cit., 179.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Meenan, op. cit., 47, 321.
 20. F. Walsh, 'The structure of neo-colonialism: the case of the. Irish Republic', to appear
 in the forthcoming Irish issue of Antipode, scheduled for Dec. 1979.
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 for the most part displayed little entrepreneurial spirit. Even for the more
 discerning among them, the small home market held little attraction
 compared with alternative opportunities abroad. Much of the existing
 industrial base was still foreign-owned, and this sector had little tendency to
 re-invest profits locally. Meanwhile, the most able sections of the
 population continued to be eroded by emigration. Some attempts were
 made to fill the gap by the establishment of state-owned industry, but
 though these proved to be successful for the most part, the government
 found itself unable to commit itself to this potential solution to the
 country's economic problems.
 Thus, manufacturing employment declined from 184,000 in 1951 to
 172,000 in 1960, as the postwar boom expended itself and renewed
 emigration engendered a downward spiral at home. The resignation of De
 Valera in 1959 coincided with the highest emigration rate in the state's
 short history and the introduction of a new industrial policy which reversed
 that which had gone before. This new policy was designed to attract foreign
 investment into the South. The incentives offered are much the same as
 those available in the North, with the important addition of a 15-year tax
 holiday on profits derived from exports. This latter incentive has given the
 South a clear advantage over the North in terms of attracting new industry.
 Thus, it has been estimated that up to 75,000 new manufacturing jobs were
 created in the South by 1974 as a result of the policies developed since
 1959, an annual rate of 5,000, or 1,000 above that in the North in the
 nineteen sixties.21 Against this, however, must be set the costs incurred by
 the dismantling of tariff barriers which was necessitated by the adoption of
 an export-orientated policy. This has led to serious casualties within the
 domestic-orientated industrial sector following exposure to competition
 from abroad. Up to 1973 the establishment of new industry clearly
 outweighed the latter casualties, and in that year employment in
 manufacturing reached 217,000 compared with 172,000 in 1960, and
 constituted almost 21 per cent of the labour force compared with 16 per
 cent in the latter year.22
 However, the entry of Ireland into the E.E.C. in 1973, and the
 coincident international recession have severely affected the indigenous
 sector, and even though E.E.C. entry has gready accelerated the rate of
 foreign investment in the South, particularly from the U.S.A.,
 manufacturing employment nevertheless declined to 195,000 in 1977,
 although there has been a slight improvement in 1978.23
 21. Moore, et al., op. cit., 103-5.
 22. W. Black, 1977, industrial development and regional policy', in N. J. Gibson and J.
 E. Spencer (Eds.), Economic Activity in Ireland; Dublin; Gill and Macmillan; Table 2.1,41.
 23. Irish Times, October 2, 1978, 14.
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 THE NORTH AND SOUTH COMPARED
 The cumulative effect of the policy developments outlined in the previous
 sections has been to draw the industrial structures of the North and South
 much closer together than they have been in the past. This effect may be
 analysed in terms of industrial composition, sources of new industry, and
 spatial distribution of new industry.
 Industrial Composition: Initially we may observe that while the
 proportion of the total labour force accounted for by manufacturing
 industry in the North has declined somewhat in recent years (from 35 per
 cent in 1960 to 31 per cent in 1973), the corresponding proportion in the
 South increased from 16 to 21 per cent in the same period, and was, of
 course, less than ten per cent in the nineteen twenties.24 Secondly, while the
 export orientation of Northern industry has remained stable through the
 nineteen sixties at 70 per cent of total output, that of the South has
 increased from 18 per cent in 1960 to 33 per cent in 1973.
 The internal configuration of the manufacturing sector in both North
 and South for the years 1960 and 1973 is presented in Table 1:
 TABLE 1
 Subsectoral composition of employment in the manufacturing sector, Northern Ireland and
 the Irish Republic, 1960 and 1973.
 Northern Ireland Irish Republic
 Subsector I960 1973 1960 1973
 (%) (%) (%) (%)
 Food, Drink, Tobacco 14.4 16.2 29.7 26.1
 Textiles, Clothing, Footwear 46.3 39.8 27.8 22.3
 Shipbuilding, Engineering, Metals 24.9 23.8 10.2 15.9 Vehicles 4.2 4.7 5.8 5.8
 Chemicals 0.9 1.3 3.6 4.5
 Other 9.2 14.1 23.0 25.4
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Employment (000s) 188.6 172.1 150.7 202.4
 Source: W. Black, Ref. 21, Table 2.4. Irish Republic figures refer to firms employing more
 than three persons.
 In the South, the leading sector is Food, Drink and Tobacco, which is to
 be expected in a country with a large agricultural sector. However, the
 relative importance of this sector has declined slightly, while that of the
 North has increased. On the other hand, the Textiles, Clothing and
 Footwear group in the North is still clearly the leading sector, although it
 24. Black, 'Industrial development...', loc. cit. The material in the following paragraphs is
 largely based on this source.
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 has declined somewhat ? as, indeed, it has done in the South. However,
 this mild decline in the North masks a rapid decline in the traditional linen
 industry, and its replacement to a certain extent by synthetic textiles which
 now account for about one quarter of textile employment and a much
 larger proportion of output. In the South also, there has been a substantial
 decline in those industries based on natural fibres but at the same time an
 inflow of synthetic textile industries.
 In the North, the Shipbuilding, Engineering, and Metals group has
 almost managed to hold its relative position within the context of an overall
 absolute decline in manufacturing employment, but again the aggregate
 figure conceals much internal movement. Here, the major casualties have
 been shipbuilding and textile machinery, while the main beneficiaries have
 been electrical and instrument engineering. This group has made rapid
 progress in the South, based largely on electrical engineering and
 electronics.
 The other major difference between North and South appears in the
 "Other" category, which is of much greater significance in the South. This
 reflects, in the South, the build-up of a diverse domestic-orientated sector
 during the era of protection, and in the North, a tradition of industrial
 specialisation. In addition, new industries attracted to the North may have
 been attracted by the existing industrial base, whereas the greater mix in the
 South may have caused less selectivity in the pattern of incoming industry.
 Nevertheless, the relative position of the "Other" category has been
 growing much more rapidly in the North than the South.
 The overall picture, then, supports the idea of a growing convergence
 between the two industrial structures, although they still display marked
 differences. Perhaps of particular significance is the fact that the leading
 growth industries within such sectors as textiles and engineering are
 virtually identical in both cases.
 Sources of new industry: Perhaps the greatest evidence of convergence
 appears in the ownership and sources of new industry establishing in both
 North and South. Since 1945, Northern policy has been geared to
 attracting new industry from outside the region entirely, and indeed of the
 new employment generated in the period 1945-73, only 13.6 per cent
 emanated from domestic sources. Since industry generated in this period
 now accounts for 43 per cent of the total, and since an amount of Northern
 industry was already externally-owned before 1945, then it seems
 reasonable to suggest that perhaps between 40-50 per cent of Northern
 manufacturing employment is now represented by externally-owned firms.
 More important, this proportion is rising rapidly.
 A further significant fact is that the role of Great Britain as a source of
 new Northern industry has been declining in recent years. Thus, whereas in
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 1963 only four per cent of the North's manufacturing workforce was
 employed by non-British overseas firms, by 1971 the figure had risen to
 16.7 per cent.25 United States firms alone account for two thirds of this
 employment. However, this source has been severely affected by the civil
 unrest, to the extent that while twenty two non-British overseas plants
 located in the North in the period 1965-70, only nine did so in the period
 1970-75.*?
 In the South, during the period 1960-76, 680 overseas plants were
 established, and were expected to provide 80,000 jobs at full capacity.27
 Again, if account is taken of overseas industry which was already in
 operation prior to 1960, it may be suggested that around 50 per cent of
 Southern manufacturing employment arises in externally-owned concerns.
 This figure is corroborated by a study indicating that in 1972, some 53.5
 per cent of the fixed assets of all Irish-registered industrial and service
 companies were owned externally.28 More important, once again, is the fact
 that the proportion of total employment held by foreign companies is rising
 rapidly. In recent years, the foreign sector has been accounting for about
 80 per cent of total annual investment in manufacturing industry,29 and
 since much of the indigenous investment has merely been replacing
 industries driven out of business by recession and external competition, the
 proportion of total employment represented by the foreign sector has
 continued to rise.
 In the case of the South, the U.S. has clearly been the main source of
 foreign industry, accounting for 42 per cent of all projected jobs in the
 foreign sector in the period 1960-76, compared with 21 per cent for the
 U.K., 14 per cent for West Germany, and 23 per cent from various other
 sources.30 Indeed, since Ireland's E.E.C. entry, the rate of U.S. investment
 has accelerated, and this source alone has accounted for over 50 per cent
 of total foreign investment since 1973.31
 Spatial distribution of new industry: Some brief comments on the spatial
 distribution of new industry in Ireland are in order, since this has been one
 of the most interesting features of the industrial drive in both North and
 25. P. j. McDermott, 1977, 'Overseas investment and the industrial geography of the
 United Kingdom*; Area; Vol. 9, No. 3, Table 2, 203.
 26. Overseas manufacturing investment in Northern Ireland; Dept. of Commerce; Belfast;
 1976.
 27. IDA Ireland, Supplement to Young Citizen; Dublin; Nov. 1977.
 28. J. Sweeney, 1973, Foreign companies and the industrialisation of the Irish Republic;
 Unpublished M. A. Thesis; University College, Dublin.
 29. J. Lyons, 1978 'Ireland's Industrial Development Authority', Ireland Today, Nov. 15,
 1978, 3 and 5.
 30. IDA Ireland, op. cit.
 31. 'Acceleration in U.S. Irish investment', op, cit.
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 South. In the South, the Industrial Development Authority has confounded
 the growth centre theorists by successfully implementing a dispersionist
 policy while still maintaining a high (and growing) level of foreign
 investment inflow. Thus, rural regions such as the West region have
 outperformed more urbanised regions in the east and south. This topic has
 been discussed by the author in detail elsewhere,32 and will not be
 considered further here.
 Similarly, in the North, it has been found that the very largest new firms
 have been least attracted by the existing industrial areas centred on Belfast,
 and have been most inclined to locate west of the Bann where Catholics
 predominate. These firms would appear to be more attracted to sources of
 trainable labour which can operate standardised processes than sources of
 labour already trained in traditional industrial skills.33 They have therefore
 tended to reverse the imbalance in industrial jobs as between both sides of
 the Bann. Thus, in the period to 1966, only 10.7 per cent of government
 sponsored jobs were located west of the Bann, in an area representing over
 a quarter of the North's population. However, between 1967-71, when
 there was an influx of large firms, 36 per cent of new jobs were established
 west of the Bann.34 It would appear that this development has also
 encouraged the Northern authorities to tone down, as in the South, a
 growth centre policy enunciated in the nineteen sixties in favour of more
 dispersion for industry.35
 DISCUSSION
 It would appear that the multinational corporation is the key element in the
 growing similarity between the industrial structures of the North and
 South. However, this convergence cannot be expected to lead to any
 significant increase in the degree of economic interlinkage between the two
 parts of the island, which at the moment is very little. Rather does it signify
 increasing disintegration of the individual economies on both sides of the
 border. In both North and South, the multinational branch plant appears as
 an economic enclave, importing the bulk of its requirements and exporting
 virtually all of its output. It therefore generates few linkages with the local
 economy.36 The developing role of Ireland, both North and South, then,
 32. F. Walsh, 1979, 'Foreign direct investment and regional planning in the Irish
 Republic', paper presented to the symposium of the International Geographical Union
 Commission on Industrial Systems, Rotterdam, June 1979.
 33. M?rie, et al., op. cit., 68-75.
 34. Ibid., 50.
 35. Black, 'Industrial development. . .\ op. cit., 75-76.
 36. M?rie, et. al., op. cit., 56; D. McAleese, 1971, 'Capital inflows and direct foreign
 investment in Ireland 1952-70*, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of
 Ireland, Vol. 32, Part 4.
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 will be to act as production bases for multinational firms supplying the
 E.E.C. market. Indeed, the simultaneous entry of both parts of Ireland into
 the E.E.C, by leading to the reduction and possible eventual elimination of
 obstacles to movement across the border, may mean that increasingly
 Ireland will appear as a single unit from the perspective of foreign firms
 seeking a possible investment location.
 It is possible to envisage a growth in cross-border linkage arising from
 the central role of multinational firms in Irish industrialisation. This may
 arise as one of the consequences of the exports profits tax relief scheme
 operated in the South. This encourages firms whose Irish plant has either
 backward or forward linkages (or both) with sister plants elsewhere to
 engage in the manipulation of intracompany transfer prices, so that overall
 profits are concentrated in the non-tax-paying Irish operation. Such
 activities among multinational firms are* well known.37 Thus, such firms
 could locate linked firms on either side of the Irish border, thereby
 minimising linkage costs while facilitating transfer price manipulation. This
 consideration might help explain the location by the Courtaulds firm of a
 spinning plant in Letterkenny, County Donegal to supply a weaving and
 finishing plant 25 miles away in Deny, both of which were constructed
 simultaneously. Plans by the E.E.C. Commission to stimulate economic
 development in the border areas and thereby cross-border co-operation
 could have the effect of increasing awareness among multinational firms of
 the possibilities offered by such 'cross-border integration'.
 The potential political implications of the growing convergence between
 North and South could provide the basis for some interesting speculation.
 It has already been suggested that multinational firms will have an
 decreasing tendency to differentiate between both parts of the island as
 possible locations for investment. It may further be noted that the incentive
 packages on both sides of the border are quite similar, and at the same time
 superior to almost all other E.E.C. regions, thereby making the North and
 South even more indistinguishable to foreign business eyes. As the extent of
 external control of both economies develops from its already high level,
 therefore, one may expect the political significance of the border to decline.
 At the moment, the major basis for distinction between North and South
 as far as multinationals are concerned is the civil unrest in the North. It
 seems obvious that the reduced inflow of foreign investment into the North
 since 1970 and the increased inflow into the South in the same period are
 not unlinked. Yet it is possible that foreign investment could have a major
 long term role in reducing unrest in the North. A crucial aspect of the
 growing convergence of North and South has been the gradual elimination
 37. S. Lall, 1973, 'Transfer pricing by multinational companies', Oxford Economic
 Papers, Vol. 35, No. 3.
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.215 on Wed, 11 Apr 2018 16:12:40 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 14  THE MAYNOOTH REVIEW
 of the North's traditional indigenous bourgeoisie. The growth of this
 bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century was, of course, a major element in the
 development of sectarian strife in the North.38 At the same time, the
 North's new industrialists, as indicated earlier, have shown a tendency to
 ignore previous patterns of spatial (and therefore religious) discrimination,
 and instead to seek out locations which offer the best economic advantages.
 This 'new bourgeoisie', then, may not have as much time for sectarian
 divides as their predecessors, and as their control over the economy widens,
 it may be that the economic basis of the North's civil unrest will gradually
 disappear.
 Untimately, of course, the political effects of the multinationalisation of
 the Irish economies will depend on its ability to combat unemployment in
 both areas. In the North, foreign investment has been unable to outweigh
 the decline of traditional industries, so that total manufacturing
 employment had declined (Table 1). As a result, unemployment has tended
 to increase, despite higher emigration.39 Of course, this might not have
 happened, had not the outbreak of civil unrest deterred foreign investment
 in recent years.
 In the South, the experience has been very much the same. Again, the
 rapid decline of traditional industry has reduced manufacturing
 employment, despite a surge of foreign investment in recent years. It is
 obvious that things would have been worse had not the Northern troubles
 diverted investment to the South. This inter-dependence has become
 increasingly apparent as both governments compete tooth and nail to
 attract major enterprises being offered by multinational firms. It may be
 that the process of clearance of weak industries is now nearing completion
 in both economies, and that the employment situation will tend to recover
 in the near future. However, in the South at least, demographic trends are
 now threatening to engulf the best efforts of the authorities to create new
 employment. Emigration, which had virtually disappeared in the South in
 the early seventies, is now beginning to re-emerge, and indeed government
 spokespersons have recently begun to talk about the need to prepare people
 for emigration. If this traditional remedy does not become available as it
 was in the past, it could be that the locus of political instability will
 eventually shift from the North to the South.
 St. Patrick's College,
 Maynooth.
 Francis Walsh
 38. See J. MacLaughlin, 'Industrial capitalism, Ulster Unionism and Orangeism'; and J.
 Anderson, 'Uneven development, nationalism, and religion in Ireland', both in the
 forthcoming Irish issue of Antipode, December 1979.
 39. Moore, et al., op. cit., Tables 2 and 3.
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